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Abstract 
This paper proposes four pricing models for a multimodal corridor transportation system with trip-chain costs. The transportation
system comprises a subway parallel to a bottleneck-constrained highway between a residential area and a workplace. Commuters 
can get their destination by either auto mode or transit mode only; besides these, they can first drive to the bottleneck, park there 
and then take subway to the destination. The solutions of these four models correspond to the hierarchical logit-based stochastic
equilibria among travel costs and trip benefits with different optimization objectives. It is shown that when transit and park-and-
ride place are operated by government and parking lot at working area belongs to the private enterprise, lower transit fares and
higher parking fee in the central area can effectively encourage P&R mode choice, increase transit attraction and maximize the 
total net benefit of the system. Numerical results support the on-going differentiated parking charge policy in Beijing. 
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1. Introduction 
As the result of urban revitalization, many metropolitan areas have witnessed explosive growth of traffic demand. 
Due to limited supply, traffic demand management is imperative at present. One of the strategies is to encourage 
park and ride (P&R) travel, namely guiding auto commuters to park at bottleneck, and then take the high capacity 
public transport mode to finish rest part of the trip. In Beijing, 26 large sized P&R facilities are expected to be built 
to connect new transit lines during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period. Meanwhile, parking fee mechanism will be 
established according to the parking lots’ areas, positions, time intervals and forms. Since April 1, 2011, a new 
differentiated parking fee policy has been implemented, keeping lower charges in P&R parking lot while raising 
fees at center parking lot. However, it should be pointed out that though the economic regulation measures are 
helpful to improve the public transit attraction and ease the metropolitan transportation pressure, it will certainly 
intensify the competition among government and parking lot owners. Therefore, the nature of the differentiated 
pricing policy should be further discussed. 
Many studies on trip distribution in a multimodal corridor have been carried out [1-4]. Tabuchi [5] and Huang [6]
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analyzed the choice behavior between private car and subway based on deterministic and multinomial logit 
stochastic equilibrium respectively. On the basis of [5], Tian et al. [7] made an important extension by adding a P&R 
option at bottleneck, yet they still assumed commuters’ mode choice behavior follows multinomial logit stochastic 
equilibrium. Although this model is more close to the reality than deterministic model [8], it assumes all options are 
independent. In fact, it is not suitable for the case with P&R option which is a combination mode of auto and transit. 
On the contrary, hierarchical logit model is more appropriate for mode split prediction when correlation exists 
among the involved transport modes.  
Traditional trip distribution models mainly focus on a single trip such as “home to work” or “work to home” trip. 
It may lead to inappropriate prediction of travel distribution or evaluation of traffic policy because of the separation 
of round trip [9]. In fact, there exists close connection between ‘to’ and ‘from’ travelers, especially for those by car. 
Whether the car is parked at work area or P&R station, the driver has to pick it up at the parking lot then back home. 
Such “home-work-home” round travel is the most simple and common trip chain [10].
Considering the “home-work-home” trip chain costs, this paper investigate fares, parking fees and corresponding 
modal split under four market schemes in the railway/highway parallel corridor with P&R option. Commuters first 
decide to travel by car or subway, and then those by auto will select either P&R at bottleneck or continuing driving 
to work. Their choice behavior is depicted by a hierarchical logit stochastic equilibrium model. These four schemes 
are: net social benefit maximization, profit maximization of a transit company only, profit maximization of a 
parking lot management company only and duopoly price competition, respectively. Findings provide insights for 
parking fee policy and transportation system design. 
2. Hierarchical logit-based models with trip chain 
2.1. Basic description 
As shown in Fig.1, H (a residential area or home) and W (a workplace) are connected by a simplified two-
direction corridor with a parallel railway/highway system. A P&R parking lot (P2) and a transfer hub (TS) are 
located at the highway bottleneck (B). Also, a parking lot (P1) is located in the workplace. Denote distance from H 
to B and B to W as  and  respectively, and the highway capacities of the two directions are s

 and s

respectively. 
For simplification, directions of home to work and back home are represented by  and  , respectively [ 11].
Home-Work 
Work-Home 
H
P1
W
P2
B
TS
Fig. 1 Two-direction corridor with a bottleneck 
There are three types of modes providing transportation service: transit mode only, auto mode only and P&R 
mode. Denote ,  as the numbers of commuters who not use and use the private car, respectively.  and 
represent the numbers of commuters choosing P&R and auto only, respectively, as in Fig. 2. is the total number 
of travelers between H and W. We then have 
1N 2N 21N 22N
N
21 22 2N N N  , and 1 2N N N  .
2.2. Mode choice based on hierarchical logit stochastic equilibrium model 
Since P&R has correlation with auto and transit modes, hierarchical logit stochastic equilibrium model is more 
suitable to describe mode choice behavior than multinomial logit model [8]. The decision process is shown in Fig. 2. 
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Here we assume that the P&R and auto only modes are relevant options. Similar analysis can also be carried out 
supposing that the P&R and transit only modes are relevant. 
Auto-2 Transit only-1
Auto only-22 P&R-21
CBD commuters
Fig. 2 Structure of a hierarchical logit model 
We use the generalized utility function to characterize each mode as follows:
1 0 1V U C 1  
21
, (1a)
21 0 21 2V U C      ,  (1b)
22 0 22 2V U C 22     , (1c) 
where 0U  is a constant term representing the utility received through a working trip, it could be related to 
individual’s daily income; 1C , 21  and 22  are the travel costs of selecting transit, auto and P&R modes 
respectively; i
C C
  and  2 j  represent the perception errors in specifying the mode utilities. Hence, the conditional 
utilities of selecting P&R and auto modes are: 
211 2V C 21   , (2a)
222 2V C 22   , (2b)
Suppose the random terms i  and 2 j  be identically and independently distributed Gumbel variables with mean 
zero, and variances of them are 0  and 00 , respectively, then at equilibrium the modal split at aggregate demand 
level is governed by the two logit formula specified below [8]:
 
 1,
2
2
2
2
2
exp
, 1,
exp
j
i
i
j
C
N N i
C


   2 , (3) 
 
 1,2
exp
, 1,
exp jj
i
i
C
N
C
N i


   2 , (4) 
where 006    and 06   . Obviously, the larger the values of   and  , the smaller the perception 
error to travel utility. This means commuters prefer to select the mode with the minimal measured travel cost. In 
addition, the modal splits (3) and (4) are not affected by adding an identical constant to the function (1).  
Using the hierarchical logit model, the expected travel cost of selecting auto mode  can be calculated by 2C
  2 21,21 ln exp jjC C    . (5) 
Similarly, the expected travel cost of all commuters is: 
  1,21 ln exp jjC C    , (6) 
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where  
N
 must hold in Eqs. (3)-(6) in accordance with the discrete choice theory [8]. Generally, the overall 
demand  is inversely proportional to the expected travel cost C , i.e.,  N D C , satisfying d / d 0N C  . Let 
 denote the inverse demand function or the marginal trip benefit with the property  N1( )B N D d ( ) / d 0B N N  .
According to the representative traveler utility theory [12], an equilibrium between individual travel costs and trip 
benefit at expectation level can be formulated as follows (proof is omitted here for saving space): 
1 1 2 2(ln 1) / (ln 1) / (ln 1) / ( )N C N C N B N          , (7a) 
21 21 22 22 2 2(ln 1) / (ln 1) / (ln 1) /N C N C N C          , (7b) 
with 21 22 2  and 1 2 .N N N NN N  N (ln 1) / ( )N B   is the marginal trip benefit perceived by every 
commuter, and other items constitute the marginal costs perceived by commuters of each mode. It’s easy to show 
that the solution of Eq. (7) is a hierarchical logit-based mode split as given by Eqs. (3) and (4). Moreover, Eq. (7) 
will be reduced to the case of general multinomial logit model when   [7]. Formulation of travel costs of the 
three modes will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3. Formulation of trip-chain-based costs 
(i) Transit mode only 
The daily travel cost of transit mode only consists of travel costs in the morning and evening and the opportunity 
cost, i.e.,  
1 1 1 1C C C  
 
0C , (8) 
The cost experienced by a transit commuter should depend on the travel time, the discomfort generated by body 
congestion in carriage and the transit fare, as below: 
     1 1 11 1/ [ , , ]C L l v q N L q N N l      21 1f  , (9a)
     1 1 1 1 1 21/ [ , , ]C L l v q N L q N N l        1f , (9b) 
  is the unit cost of travel time, 1v  is the average velocity of transit,  ,q n x  and  ,q n xwhere   represent the 
discomfort experience by a transit commuter in the morning and evening respectively which are increasing functions 
of the number of commuters selecting this mode and the traveling distance, 1f  is the transit fare and 1  is the unit 
cost of discomfort experienced by commuters.  
(ii) P&R mode  
Similar to (1), daily travel cost of P&R mode consists of four parts, i.e., 
21 21 21 20C C C C  
 
1p
f
, (10) 
where 20C  is the opportunity cost and 1  is the parking fee at bottleneck parking lot. The cost experienced by a 
P&R commuter includes the travel time, the body congestion cost, auto fixed cost and the transit fare, as below: 
p
   21 2 1 2 1 21 2 2/ / ,C L v l v T q N N l F         , (11a) 
   21 2 1 2 1 21 2 2/ / ,C L v l v T q N N l F         f , (11b) 
where v  is the car velocity, T  and T  are the time required for realizing transfer between auto and transit in the 2
 
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morning and evening, respectively, 2f  is the transit fare at P&R station, 2F  is the auto fixed cost and 2  is the unit 
cost of discomfort experienced by commuters getting on at the P&R station. 
(iii) Auto mode only 
If the number of auto users exceeds the bottleneck capacity, a queue develops. In order to avoid or reduce the 
waiting time in queue, some commuters will leave home earlier or later in the morning which generates schedule 
delay costs. Let   be the unit cost of schedule delay arriving-early，   be the unit cost of schedule delay arriving-
late. In accordance with bottleneck theory [13], at equilibrium  auto commuters have the same travel cost in the 
morning, i.e.,  
22N
 22 2 22 2C L l v s    / /N  F

, (12) 
where       
F
 and the second term in (12) is the synthetic cost of queuing time and schedule delay. 
Similarly, the travel cost in the evening is: 
  2 222 2 2C L l v s    / /N  , (13) 
where         ,   is the unit cost of schedule delay leaving-early，   be the unit cost of schedule delay 
leaving-late. Then the total daily travel cost of auto mode commuters is: 
222 22C C C 
 
2 0p
p
, (14) 
where  is the parking fee at working area. In accordance with the theoretic conditions for stability [0
13], we assume 
that      and     .
3. Strategies of transit fare and parking fee under four market schemes 
In this section, it should be pointed out that we assume the fare and parking fee in P&R station are collected as a 
whole through scanning the public transit IC card, which can effectively contain the parking behavior without 
transferring and encouraging the use of P&R mode. Then fares and parking fees of the round trip are compared 
under different schemes.  
3.1. Net social benefit maximization 
We derive the optimal transit fare and parking fee through maximizing the net social benefit of the system and 
solve the corresponding modal split. This means all facilities are operated and managed by government. The 
optimization problem is as follows:  
1 1
21 21 2
2 2
0
2 22
1 1 21 1 11 21 21 2 1 22 0
maxmize ( )d ln / ( ln ln ) /
                    l / ( ln ln ) / ]
                    [ ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2( ) 2 ]
N
NSB B w N N N N N
N N N N
f N C f p N C N N c F
 
  
  
      

2 2
1
[
n
w N
N N
N C
 
 
22N N
22 )p
(15) 
s.t. (7) and
1 2N N N 21 2 ， , , , . (16) N 1 0N  21 0N  22 0N 
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cwhere 1  is the variable cost and 1F  is the fixed operating cost of transit. In (15), the integration term is the 
deterministic trip benefit of all commuters from traveling; the first square bracket term represents the difference 
between the expected values of random parts of trip benefit and cost; the second square bracket term is the total 
social cost eliminating fares and fees.  
The o maximize the l bene ansit fare (round trip) should be set asorem 1. In order t net socia fit, the tr
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 ; commuters selecting P&R mode 
(round trip) should be charged amounting to 
' '
1 1 21
'
1 21
'
1[ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ) ( , )] 2N q N L q N L N N q N N l q N N l c        
   
1 1 2 21 1 21 1
' '
( )[ ( , )N N q N N l q N    21 1( , )] 2N l c 
 
( / / )
; commuters who 
park in the workplace should pay an amount of 22s s N 
  
.
Theorem 1 suggests that the single trip transit fare is the sum of the body congestion externality caused by a 
marginal transit commuter and the variable cost; the fare in the P&R station of a single trip is the sum of the body 
congestion externality caused by a marginal P&R commuter and the variable cost; parking fee in the workplace is 
the queue externality generated by an additional auto commuter. If we only consider the morning peak or evening 
peak travel, then parking fee will be underestimated to the amount of 22 /N s
 
 or 22 /N s
 
, ignoring the queue 
externality caused by evening or morning congestion. 
3.2. Transit company’s profit maximization and parking lot operated by government 
If th ot in the workplace is still operated by government, then the parking fee is given by 
0 22 . While the transit company wants to optimize the fare for maximizing profit, the problem is 
formulated as follows: 
e parking l
s N( / / )p s    
1 1 21 2 1 1 21 1 1maxmize [2 (2 )] 2( ) 2F N f N f p N N c F      (17)  
s.t. (7), (16) and 
0 2( / / ) 2s s Np   
  
. (18)  
The first square bracket term in objective function (17) is the total income of the transit corporation, including 
fares collected from two stations, where the parking fee at the P&R station is covered in the transit fare. The second 
term is the variable costs varying with the load and the last term is the fixed operating cost. Maximizing F  with 
respect to  and , we obtain: 1N 21N
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 21 1 21 1 21 1
1 21 22 2
'
1 2
' '
2
'
2
2 [ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ) ( , )] 2 +1/
                        [( ) / ( )] ( ),
f N q N L q N L N N q N N l q N N l c
N N g N N h g
 

        
   
   
 (19) 
2 1 1 1 2 21 1 21 1 21 1
1 21 21 2 22
' '
22 2
2 ( )[ ( , ) ( , )] 2 1/
               [( ) / ( )][ 1/ ( )] ( ),
f p N N q N N l q N N l c
N N h N N g N h g
 
 
       
    
 
 (20) 
where 1/ 1/ 1/    , 0  , 1 / ( ) ( )h N B N   , 22 22 21 / ( ) 1/ ( ) 2( / / )g N N s s      
  
h.  represents the 
expected marginal profit of traveling [7].
Theorem 2.  The fares for transit and P&R commuters generated by maximizing the profit of transit company are 
both higher than those by maximizing the net social benefit. The differences are  
1 21 22 21 2 221 1 / [( ) / ( )] ( )h N N g N N h g       ,
1 21 21 2 22 2 221 21 / [( ) / ( )][ 1/ ( )] ( )N N h N N g N h g         .
Clearly, the above differences become identical when the model is the multinomial logit one. This says, when 
  , we have    and then 1 21 1 21 221 / ( ) / (1/ 1/ )N N g h       [7].
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0p
2
3.3. Parking lot owner’s profit maximization and transit operated by government 
If the transit is operated by government, while the parking lot owner wants to maximize the revenue from 
charging the commuters by auto only. The problem is formulated as follows: 
22maxmize P N  (21) 
s.t. (7), (16) and 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 21 1 2
' '
1 1 2
' '
1 12 [ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ) ( , )] 2f N q N L q N L N N q N N l q N N l c         
   
' '        
,  (22)
2 1 1 1 2 21 1 21 1 21 12 ( )[ ( , ) ( , )]f p N N q N N l q N N l c .  (23) 
However, the analytical comparisons of 0  with other mechanisms cannot be carried out because of its complex 
formulae. Section 4 will demonstrate this by numerical results. 
p
3.4. Pricing game between transit and parking lot owner 
In reality, parking lot and transit usually belong to different companies. Both of them expect to maximize own 
profit via pricing policy. The pricing game will reach the Nash equilibrium state after a long time. The optimization 
problem is as follows:  
To transit company, the objective function is  
1 1 21 2 1 1 21 1 1maxmize [2 (2 )] 2( ) 2F N f N f p N N c F       (24) 
To parking lot owner, the objective function is  
22maxmize P N 0p (25) 
s.t. (7) and (16).
Similar to the method used before, we obtain: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 21 1 2
' ' '
1 1 21 1
1 21 22
'
21 2 22
2 [ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ) ( , )]
+1/ [( ) / ( )] ( ) ,
+2f N q N L q N L N N q N N l q N N l
h N N h N
c
N h h
  
 
      
   
   
 (26) 
'
2 1 1 1 2 21 1 21 1 21 1
1 21 21 2 2
'
2 2 2 2
2 ( )[ ( , ) ( , )] 2 1/
                     [( ) / ( )][ 1/ ( )] ( ),
f p N N q N N l q N N l c
N N h N N h N h h

 
       
    
   (27) 
22
21 2 1 2 1 1 1 21 1 21 2
22
1 1 21 1 21 1 21 1 21 1
0
' ' 2
2
' ' ' '
2 21
( / / ) 1/
[ 1/ ( )][( ) / ( ) ] [ ( , ) ( , )] [ 1/ ( )]
,
{ [ ( , ) ( , )]}{ [ ( , ) ( , )]} ( )( )
p N s s
h N h h N hh q N N l q N N l h N
N
h q N N l q N N l h q N N l q N N l h h h h

  
   

  
       
          
  
 
   
(28) 
where ,
 and .
They are the expected travel costs of transit, P&R and auto, respectively.  
' ' ' '
1 1 1 1 1 1 21 1 211/ ( ) [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]h N q N L q N L q N N l q N N l       
   
'
21 21 2 1 21 1 21
'
21 / ( ) 1/ ( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]h N N q N N l q N N l       
 
22 221/ (h N 2) 1/ ( ) ( / / )N s s      
  
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Theorem 3.  Fares for transit and P&R commuters in competitive situation are higher than the results for the net 
social benefit maximization and the differences are 1 21 22
'
21 2 221 1/ [( ) / ( )] ( )h N N h N N h h      ，
1 21 21 2 22 2 22
'
21 1/ [( ) / ( )][ 1/ ( )] ( )N N h N N h N h h         , respectively. 
Clearly, the two differences are equal when the model degenerates into the multinomial logit case. That is, when 
  ,  ， we have .1 21 1 1 2' ' 2 21 / ( ) / (1/ 1/ )N N h h      
Theorem 4.  Fares for transit and P&R commuters in competitive situation are lower than the results for transit 
company profit maximization.
Clearly, the differences are equal when the model degenerates into the multinomial logit case, i.e., when   ,
 ，the difference is 1 21 22 22 2 22 2 2( )( ) [( )(h N N h g h h h g    )] .
Theorem 5.  Parking fee for auto commuters in competitive situation are higher than the result for the net social 
benefit maximization, the difference is  
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Clearly, when the model degenerates into the multinomial logit case, i.e., when   ,  ，the difference is  
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4. Numerical experiment 
Up to now, we have formulated four pricing models based on hierarchical logit-based equilibrium concept in a 
multimodal transportation system with trip-chain costs. Note that the groups of nonlinear equations formulated for 
each modeling must be numerically solved so it is difficult to check the properties of the solutions analytically. In 
this section, we present a numerical example to demonstrate the results generated by the four pricing schemes. 
The parameters of our numerical example are: 2 2( , ) 
 
=(30,15)($/hour), 2 2( , ) 
 
=(15,30)($/hour), 
 =20($/hour), ( , )s s l
( , )T T
 
1
 
=(4000,3000)(vehicle/hour), =20(km/hour), =30(km/hour), =30km, =5km,
=(0.2,0.15)(hour), 
1v 2v L
F =0, 2F =10($), =0.5($/person), 1c 1 =0.85e-5($/discomfort), 2 =1.2e-5($/discomfort), 
, , 10C 0 20C 0 0.1  , 2 
)x 
. We adopt the following inverse demand function: ,
where =10000. This function implies that the demand is less sensitive to the marginal trip benefit with a larger 
value of G  and thus the final realized demand will be higher. The function describing body congestion discomfort 
takes the form , where 
 B N G   ln /N maxN
maxN
2Dn1( / )( )x v En( ,q n x) q
 
( ,n 0.05D   and 0.25E  [6].
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Fig. 3 Relative value of fares (to parking fee in the workplace) under different schemes
In order to show the results clearly, we use the relative values of fares to reduce the number of curves in Fig. 3 
which gives the fares for transit and P&R commuters by the four schemes. Relative values of fares for transit and 
P&R commuters are defined by the ratio of fares to parking fee in the workplace. Comparing the results by the four 
schemes, it can be seen that the two types of fares decreases in the order of schemes II (transit company profit 
maximization), IV (pricing game), I (net social benefit maximization) and III (parking lot owner’s profit 
maximization). Coinciding with the pricing levels in Fig. 3, the proportions of commuters by transit and P&R are 
increasing by the order of II, IV, I and III as shown in Fig. 4.  
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Fig. 4 Proportion of commuters selecting transit and P&R under different schemes 
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Comparing the results by schemes II and IV in Fig 4, it can be seen that the scheme IV makes the proportion of 
P&R commuters increase sharply and transit commuters slightly although the differences between their fares are 
relatively large (Fig. 3). On the other hand, scheme III increases the proportion of P&R commuters a lot due to the 
parking fee rising. It is shown that lower transit fares and higher parking fees in working area can effectively 
encourage P&R mode choice. This means that more auto commuters change to transit mode at bottleneck to ease the 
central traffic pressures. These numerical results also theoretically support the current differentiated parking fee 
policy in Beijing. 
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Fig. 5 Total demand and transit commuters (including commuters by transit and P&R) 
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Fig. 6 Net benefits of the system under different schemes 
Fig. 5 shows the total demand and the number of transit users (including transit and P&R commuters) generated 
by the four pricing policies. The first policy (scheme I) generates the most number of commuters, while the third 
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policy (scheme III) gives the second most number of commuters. But number of transit users by the latter is much 
higher than the former. However, the total net social benefit of the third policy has no significant decrease as shown 
in Fig. 6. This suggests that the current differentiated parking fee policy in Beijing is efficient. 
5. Conclusions
In this paper we propose four pricing models for a multimodal corridor transportation system with trip-chain 
costs. Commuters can go to work by three modes: transit only, P&R and auto only. The solutions of the four models 
correspond to the hierarchical logit-based stochastic equilibria among travel costs and trip benefits with different 
market schemes. It is shown that when transit and park-and-ride parking lot are operated by government and parking 
lot at working area belongs to private owner, lower transit fares and higher parking fees in central area can 
effectively encourage parking interchanging, increase public transit attraction and maximize the system’s total net 
benefit. Numerical results support the current differentiated parking charge policy in Beijing. 
The research can be extended by incorporating redistribution of the charge revenue from parking [14], which is an 
interesting direction. 
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